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ABSTRACT: Earlier in this decade, the U.S. Air Force Space Command and the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), in recognizing the need for low-cost responsive small launch vehicles, decided to 
partner in addressing this national shortcoming. Later, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) joined in supporting this effort, dubbed the Falcon Program. The objectives of the Small Launch 
Vehicle (SLV) element of the DARPA / USAF Falcon Program include the development of a low-cost small 
launch vehicle(s) that demonstrates responsive launch and has the potential for achieving a per mission cost of 
less than $5M when based on 20 launches per year for 10 years. This vehicle class can lift 1000 to 2000 lbm 
payloads to a reference low earth orbit. Responsive operations include launching the rocket within 48 hours of 
call up. A history of the program and the current status will be discussed with an emphasis on the potential 
impact on small satellites. 
INTRODUCTION 
The high cost of space access has broad negative 
impacts on the overall US. space program. Current 
interface processes and delays drive up total satellite 
costs. Flyaway costs using U.S. launches has resulted 
in significant loss of the worldwide launch market 
share over the past twenty years. Space access cost 
has inhibited the development of new space 
initiatives in civil, scientific, military, commercial, 
university and research areas. The high cost of 
launching has prevented many new innovative small 
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low-cost satellites f?om ever being built. Growth in 
the U.S. aerospace industry has been stifled with a 
diminishing or at best, a flat low level of annual 
launches. This has severely reduced opportunities 
for engineering jobs and hands on flight hardware 
experience. As aerospace engineers who began work 
in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s are rapidly retiring 
coupled with the shrinking number of U.S. launches, 
younger aerospace engineers and engineering 
managers have fewer well-seasoned engineers to 
draw from in making crucial decisions as they design 
the launch vehicles of tomorrow. Because there are 
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fewer aerospace engineering jobs available, 
universities have witnessed a significant decline in 
incoming aerospace engineering student classes. A 
U.S. small launch vehicle (SLV) with a fly away cost 
(including launch vehicle, range costs, consumables, 
payload integration and limited mission assurance 
activities) of $US 5M to $US 10M could have 
profound impact on the current approach to small 
satellites and small launch vehicles. Such a launcher 
could invigorate university aerospace engineering 
programs and provide opportunities for increased 
hands-on flight hardware experience for aerospace 
engineers as well as provide new jobs in the 
aerospace sector of industry. It could also help the 
U.S. to regain lost share in the small satellite and 
small launch vehicle markets. 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FALCON 
PROGRAM 
In May of 2003, DARPA released a Phase 1 
solicitation for concept designs of a low-cost, 
responsive SLV. Twenty-four proposals were 
received and nine study contracts with a six-month 
period of performance were awarded. The study 
contractors were AirLaunch LLC, Andrews Space, 
Exquadrum, KT Engineering, Lockheed Martin 
(Michoud), Microcosm, Orbital Science, Schafer and 
Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX). Dr. 
Steven Walker, Deputy Director of DARPA's 
Tactical Technology Office (TTO), manages the 
Falcon Program. His deputy program manager is Lt. 
Col. John Anttonen in TTO. 
In May of 2004, DARPA released a Phase 2 SLV 
detailed vehicle design, development, test and flight. 
From the received 14 proposals, four awards were 
made in September of that year: AirLaunch LLC, 
Lockheed Martin (Michoud), Microcosm, and 
SpaceX. A decision gate was inserted at the 
preliminary design review after ten months with 
program funding allowing AirLaunch LLC and 
SpaceX to continue. The SpaceX situation was 
unique in that the company was well past a 
preliminary design with a fairly mature design and 
much of the hardware already built. Instead of 
procuring launch vehicle development from SpaceX, 
DARPA procured a launch of a Government payload 
from the Reagan Test Site in the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands. It is a coincidence that the SpaceX 
launch vehicle (Falcon 1) shares the name of the 
DARPA managed Falcon program. 
AirLaunch LLC is proceeding toward a critical 
design decision gate in the fall of 2006 while SpaceX 
launched in March of 2006 from Omelek Island in the 
Kwajalein Atoll with the Falconsat-2 payload from 
the U.S. Air Force Academy. While making great 
strides, loss of mission was experienced at 
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approximately one-mile (1.6 km) altitude. SpaceX 
demonstrated responsive operations with a total crew 
of 25 personnel at Kwajalein and Omelek Islands. As 
this paper is being written, a DARPA mishap 
investigation is drawing to a close with return to 
flight activities well underway to support a planned 
Fall 2006 TacSat Risk Reduction Flight from Omelek 
Island. Funded by DARPA, this flight will also 
reduce risks for the planned 2007 TacSat-1 launch for 
the Office of Force Transformation and the Naval 
Research Laboratory. 
This first generation SpaceX SLV dubbed the Falcon 
1 has an advertised payload capability to low earth 
orbit (LEO) of 570 kg (1254 lbm) at a price of $6.7 
M, which includes range costs and basic payload 
integration. Though yet to see its first fully 
successful flight, SpaceX has agreements in place for 
a total of ten launches from commercial and 
government communities. 
SMALL SATELLITE STUDY GENESIS 
In August 2005, DARPA system engineering and 
technical assistance (SETA) contractor Booz Allen 
Hamilton (BAH) negotiated procurements with 
AeroAstro Corp and with Commercial Space 
Technologies Ltd (CST) to study the impact that the 
introduction of a responsive low-cost small launch 
vehicle would have on future small satellite 
development and on the U.S. share of the worldwide 
launch market. Mr. Tim Thompson of BAH served 
as the study manager. AeroAstro was to focus on the 
domestic market while CST focused primarily on the 
international market. For purposes of the studies, 
small satellites were defined as having a mass of no 
more than 700 kg (1543.2 lbm). This class of 
satellites was subdivided into three groups: (1) < 100 
kg (220.5 lbm); (2) 100 - 300 kg (220.5 - 661.4 
lbm); and (3) 300 - 700 kg (661.4 - 1543.2 lbm). A 
worldwide distribution of small satellites by these 
mass subdivisions is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Launched Small Sats Mass Distribution 
One observes that with the exception of the 
communications constellations (Iridium, Orbcomm 
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and Globalstar systems) launched in 1997-99, the 
launch rate for small satellites has been fairly fiat 
over the past 20 years. 
Figure 2 indicates the origin of small satellite 
launches over the past 20 years, showing again that 
with the exception of the communication 
constellations in the late 1990s that the U.S. share is 
fairly small. In the early years of this period, the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) dominated small satellite 
launches. 
As shown in Figure 3, the Government is the primary 
driver of overall worldwide launches. Though the 
first commercial launch occurred in 1962, the 
significance in numbers of commercial launches is 
growing. 
The hypothesis is that as low-cost responsive U.S. As 
SLVs are developed the small satellite launch rate 
will increase which will give impetus to increased 
SLV production rates which in turn will increase 
fuaher SLV production and further drive down SLV 
costs. As this cycle continues, at some point the ‘flat 
launch market’ experiences a fairly significant 
increase aided in large part by a ‘rack and stack’ 
launch vehicle approach likely to influence all classes 
of launch vehicles with resulting lower costs. This 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Launched Satellites by 
Origin 
Figure 3. Government Portion of All Launches 
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Small satellite missions have several major 
components which drive mission cost including: 
- Satellite design, development and test 
- Launch vehicle 
- Launch range and trackinghelemetry 
- Mission assurance 
- Satellite integration with launch vehicle 
- On-orbit checkout of satellite 
- On-orbit satellite operations 
- Satellite disposal 
Figure 4. Compound Benefits of Stimulating the 
Small Satellite I Small Launch Vehicle Market 
As SLVs become less expensive ($5M to $10M fly 
away cost) and waits for rides become shorter, the 
pervading approach to small satellite development 
will change. Currently, many small satellites in 
storage or on the drawing board are unlikely to fly 
due to cost imbalances between spacecraft and ride to 
orbit. Low-cost rides will allow for less expensive 
satellites designed for shorter life on-orbit (< three 
years), which should require less radiation hardening, 
and protection from other space environmental 
effects. In many cases, this will allow for the satellite 
technology to be updated and flown more frequently. 
Three to five million dollar satellites destined for a 
$25M or greater ride to space are difficult to insure as 
well as pass upper management’s reasonableness test. 
Flying as a secondary payload carries a set of 
challenges driven by the primary payload and the 
launch vehicle. While some are willing to 
accommodate the compromises often associated with 
secondary payloads, for many such a route means 
delays (or rush ups) in schedule, adjusting to 
changing interfaces or volume/mass allocation, 
compromise of science objectives, and sometimes 
loss of ride completely. 
Figure 5 illustrates the mission cost drive of the small 
launch vehicle. This figure shows a government 
$50M mission using the fly away cost of the lowest 
cost operational SLV today, which is 60 percent of 
the mission cost. Thus the best thing that can happen 
for the small satellite mission is to significantly 
reduce the cost of the small launch vehicle. 
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The illustration assumes a $1OM Spacecraft, $30M 
launch vehicle, $2M integration, $2M 
rangehelemetry, $1M on-orbit checkout and $5M on- 
orbit operations. 
NASA Upper End Small Sat Mission Costs 
Figure 5. Launch Vehicle is the Primary Cost 
Driver 
Range tracking and telemetry are not inexpensive. In 
order to help drive down mission costs, space-based 
range services will be needed. Today, 
NASANallops Flight Facility has prototype 
telemetry downlink and autonomous range safety 
systems flying. The low-cost TDRSS transmitter 
(LCT2) and the Autonomous Flight Safety System 
(AFSS) are scheduled to fly on the Falcon TacSat 
Risk Reduction Flight later this year. The LCT2 
should be upgraded to a transceiver next year and 
there are hopes of adding Ku band as well in order to 
increase downlink bandwidth. These systems can 
greatly reduce the cost of Government suborbital 
missions as well as continuous flight termination 
system (FTS) coverage can run into several million 
dollars with deployed land, sea and air assets. 
The Commercial Space Technologies 
Study 
In August 2005, BAH issued a study contract to 
Commercial Space Technologies, Ltd. (CST) based 
in London England. CST was asked to focus on the 
international small launch vehicle and satellite 
markets. CST is perhaps best known as a broker for 
Russian launch vehicles but has performed numerous 
satellite and launch vehicle studies. 
CST investigated the international launch vehicle 
market and history since 1985 with an eye on how the 
current launch demand for small satellites is being 
met. Concurrently, CST analyzed the impact that a 
low-cost small launch vehicle would have on the 
current market and what the impact of such launcher 
would have on future satellite development. CST 
employed a team of Russian specialists in London 
and in Moscow who are advised by experts employed 
by prime Russian aerospace companies. In addition 
to low-cost, the small launch vehicles are assumed to 
have responsive launch capability (i.e. able to be 
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launched within 48 hours of vehicle call up) per the 
DARPA Falcon program's objectives. A total 
flyaway cost for this new U.S. small launch vehicle 
was assumed to be no more than US $1OM including 
range, consumables, SLV, and mission assurance 
activities. 
The distribution of small satellites into these three 
categories allows one to estimate the most likely 
launch approach. Category 3 satellites with their 
heavier mass would most often be launched by 
dedicated launch vehicles and in rare instances, be 
accompanied by piggyback satellites from Category 
1. Category 2 satellites would usually be launched as 
rideshare payloads or with several piggyback 
payloads from Category 1. In some rare instances, 
heavier Category 1 satellites might employ cluster 
launches when intended for relatively low orbits (less 
than about 400 km). Category 1 satellites would be 
launched as piggyback payloads or in cluster 
launches. 
CST investigated the current small satellite market 
forecasts after evaluating current trends and historical 
data over the past twenty years. Concurrently, CST 
examined how current small satellite launch demands 
are being met by dedicated small launch vehicles 
(with single and rideshare payloads) and by heavier 
launch vehicles and small launch (with clusters - of 
at least 4 - and piggyback payloads). The CST study 
did not include small satellites launched into any 
orbit with an apogee higher than 3000 km (1860 mi) 
or payloads that remained attached to their upper 
stage. 
From 1985 - 2005 (with the exception of 1997 - 
1999) about 25-35 small satellites were launched per 
year. 1998 witnessed a peak of 105 small satellites 
launch and this period benefited from the Iridium, 
Orbcomm and Globalstar systems. The low earth 
orbit communication constellations lost out to the 
cable/cellular communications with their 
geostationary satellite systems. 
However, the role of low-orbital small satellites has 
remained significant for military communications. 
Such communications satellite systems could also 
service the polar regions of Canada and Russia. 
Without the development of new fields of 
applications, the current trend is for 25-30 satellites 
per year. The current applications are primarily 
composed of Earth's remote sensing (ERS) and 
scientific / experimental spacecraft. Having heavier 
masses traditionally, the ERS satellites have shown 
an average decrease in mass over the past five to ten 
years. CST believes that modem miniaturization will 
enable future ERS spacecraft masses of less than 100 
kg (220.5 lbm). 
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Russia, the U.S., Europe and China have all gone to 
higher orbits for their navigation satellite systems. 
For future projections, this leaves the ERS and 
scientific/experimental spacecraft for dominance 
among the small satellites. ERS spacecraft are 
expected to continue their trend of average decreased 
mass as miniaturization continues. In fact, it is 
expected that in the future, ERS satellite masses will 
not exceed 100 kg. CST also forecasts a majority of 
scientific/experimental small satellites will not 
exceed 100 kg and would be launched primarily in 
clusters by SLVs. 
It is expected that category 1 (heavier) small satellites 
will comprise 15-20 percent of the small sat market 
with category 2 (mid-weight) small satellites 
comprising 30-35 percent. The low-cost SLV would 
also accommodate the category 3 (light weight) 
satellites by launching in clusters and as piggybacks 
in combination with mid-weight satellites. 
With an over supply of mid-sized launch vehicles, 
many have been used to launch small satellites due to 
the mid-size launch vehicle operators being content 
with minimum profit versus the possibility of no 
profit at all. 
Competition to the low-cost SLVs will come from the 
current Russian launches and from heavier launch 
vehicles offering piggyback launches. One SLV 
developer, SpaceX, is developing a heavier lift 
vehicle (Falcon 9) with a 9300 kg payload capability 
to low earth orbit (LEO) and 3400 kg to 
geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) for an 
advertised price of $27M per flight. They are also 
advertising an S5 version of the Falcon 9 with a 5.2 
m fairing capable of placing 16,500 kg (-36,300 lbm) 
in LEO or 6,400 kg (-14,100 lbm) to GTO. Their 
largest advertised Falcon 9, the S9 model would 
accommodate 24,750 kg (-54,500 lbm) for LEO 
applications and 9,650 kg (-21,250 lbm) for GTO 
applications. 
Factors for Success 
CST indicates that there are three key factors for a 
SLV’s success: (1) optimum payload capability; (2) a 
specific launch price which is competitive against all 
methods of launch by other launch vehicles; and (3) 
availability for launching payloads in the world and 
regionaVdomestic markets. A low-cost U.S. SLV 
should be able to satisfy the optimum factor with up 
to a 700 kg (1543.2 lbm) payload capability. It 
should partially meet the second factor for price 
competition as it should see domestic success and 
perhaps partial suggest against the less expensive 
Russian launchers. The US low-cost responsive SLV 
will likely have limited success in in ready 
availability for payloads from anywhere in the world 
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due to International Traffic in A r m s  Regulations 
(ITAR) restrictions. 
CST Forecast Trends 
Forecast trends for small satellites are: (1) stable level 
of 25-35 satellites launched per year; (2) stable 
distribution by mass with 50 percent light weight, 30 
percent mid weight and 20 percent heavy weight; (3) 
domination by ERS and scientifidexperimental 
applications while communication and navigation 
applications shrink, (4) share of commercial launches 
is increasing; and (5) worldwide market leaders today 
are the U.S. and Russia but the market shares of 
Europe, Japan, China and others is growing and will 
eventually equally share the market with the U.S. and 
with Russia. Overlaid with these trends is the 
expected decrease in mass/dimensions of small 
satellites for both ERS and scientifidexperimental 
applications with observable results showing no 
earlier than five to ten years but with negligible 
impact on the yearly SLV launch rate. 
CST Conclusions 
Final conclusions reached by CST include: (1) the 
launch rate for small satellites is low and flat, 
remaining so unless external factors are brought to 
bear. (2) A U.S. low-cost SLV with optimum 
payload capability, low set price with responsive 
launch would expand the market by enhancing 
demand for launch services. (3) This market 
expansion will be realized by lightweight small 
satellite growth with current small satellite 
development approaches and by leveraging of the 
responsive access concept with significant changes in 
satellite development including large-scale small 
satellite development carrying over to larger satellites 
and reusable small satellites. (4) CST also developed 
an approximate mathematical model for forecasting 
annual SLV launch rates. They have also developed 
preliminary quantitative timing estimations for 
satellite developments and their influence on the 
small satellite market. These theoretical models 
indicate a good chance of success for a new U.S. low- 
cost responsive SLV in the worldwide small satellite 
market and especially in the U.S. domestic market. 
The AeroAstro Inc Study 
AeroAstro, Inc. is known for micro satellite and 
nanosatellite system design and fabrication, 
spacecraft technologies and components, and 
satellite-based data communications. AeroAstro 
attempted a survey of 129 different individuals and 
organizations within Government, commercial 
industry and academia. The survey involved eleven 
questions on future launch plans, payload types, orbit 
types, reasonable LV costs, important LV attributes, 
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etc. Contact was made with 58 of the 129 and of the 
58 contacted, 41 interviews were conducted. 
The interviews revealed a ground swell of interest in 
reliable low-cost access to space. Interviewees 
indicated that opportunities to fly small payloads to 
orbit are not that plentiful. The problems associated 
with being a secondary payload were mentioned in 
the interviews. These included being tied to the 
launch schedule and orbit set by the primary payload 
and coordination with the launch company. 
Additionally, the primary payload providers do not 
appreciate having secondary payloads that add risk to 
their mission. 
The study report author believes that strong 
competition for such a low-cost small launch vehicle 
resides in the Unmanned Aerial Systems (VAS) 
community. Additionally, Russian launch vehicles 
offer less expensive access to space. U.S. companies 
are willing to deal with export laws due to the lower 
cost and the interviewees' position that dealing with 
the Russians on payload integration to their launch 
vehicle is easier than in the US. This is coupled with 
the statement that the Russians are more likely to 
keep to the scheduled launch date. 
In order to drive a rapid demand for such a low-cost 
SLV, the author is convinced that cultivating a 
partnership must stimulate the commercial markets 
involving companies, which sell products or services 
benefiting from the space environment. 
Assuming the presence of a responsive, low-cost 
SLV, the following pure commercial concepts were 
identified 
- Orbital tourism, likely to include orbiting 
lodging facilities 
- Consumer imaging with resolution of one 
meter; customer would pay $100 per image 
through internet connection 
- Entertainment involving integration of real 
space hardware with on line gaming 




- Hazardous waste disposal 
Government and Department of Defense concepts 
identified were: 
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Fractionated space involving the use of several 
small satellites performing individually with 
the capability of coordination such they can 
work together for a synergistic result 
Space control and space situational awareness 
missions 
Responsive denied area surveillance 
Orbital transportation services for the 
International Space Station re-supply/mass 
download 
Technology validation and qualification in 
space prior to base lining for major 
acquisitions 
Universities involving programs such as 
AFRL's University Nanosatellite Program 
Low cost dedicated science experiments 
Past Satellite Trends 
The majority of satellites launched to date have had a 
mass greater than 1000 kg. However, over the past 
25 years the small satellite market for less than 500 
kg has been growing. During this 25-year period, of 
the 320 small satellites between 100 kg and 500 kg 
mass, the largest contributor was Russia/FSU with 
142 spacecraft. 
Of the 323 spacecraft launched having a mass of 10 
kg to 100 kg, 146 were RussianRSU small 
communication satellites deployed in groups of eight. 
Interviewee Preferences 
Mass 
Academics have the largest share in the less than 100 
lbm (45 kg) spacecraft with many below 10 lbm (4.5 
kg) while commercial and military/Government 
organizations dominate in the larger small satellites. 
Desired Orbits 
Jnterviewees generally preferred high inclination 
orbits for LEO missions and low inclination orbits for 
GTO and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) 
missions. 
Secondary Payload Opportunities 
All academic interviewees expressed a willingness to 
fly as a secondary payload with several stating that 
going this route was their only opportunity to get to 
orbit. The majority of the commercial and 
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Government organizations indicated a willingness to 
fly as secondary payloads, especially for their smaller 
satellites. 
Reaction to Proposed Dedicated Low-Cost 
Launch Vehicle 
Commercial organizations stated that they might plan 
more missions but that would be driven by market 
demands. The impression was that a low-cost US. 
SLV would drive this demand up but several wanted 
to “wait and see” remembering the low cost promises 
of the Pegasus launch vehicle. Some 
military/Government organizations indicated that 
their planned future missions are already assuming 
the presence of a US. low-cost SLV. 
Satellite Projections 
Figure 6 shows the AeroAstro projection for satellites 
over the next 20 years organized by mass and by 
customer sector. US. Air Force Space Command 
projections are omitted due to the large number of 
tactical satellites indicated. The chart emphasizes the 
dominance of the smallest small satellites by 
academia. 
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Figure 6. Satellites Project for Next 20 Years 
AeroAstro Study Conclusions 
The overall enthusiasm for a proposed U.S. low-cost 
responsive SLV was less than anticipated, in part due 
to the SpaceX Falcon I being advertised at a price 
consistent with the study reference cost. However, 
the community wants to see such a launch vehicle 
become operational before they get too excited. 
The study author believes that the greatest challenge 
is in engaging the principal economic engine of our 
country, the companies providing the goods and 
services to our population. The challenge is get these 
companies involved to create the demand for low cost 
access to space. 
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